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The construction of national identity through 
the production of ritual and spectacle 
An analysis of National Day parades in Singapore 
LILY Kor~<; AN11 BKENIM s. A. YEOH 
Department of Geography, Nutional liniversity of Singuppore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, 
Singapore I 19260 
AHSTRACT. In this paper, we adopt the view that ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ are 
social constructions, created to serve ideological ends. We discuss this in the 
specific empirical context of Singapore’s National Day parades. By drawing on 
officially produced souvenir programmes and magazines, newspaper reports, 
and interviews with participants and spectators, we analyse the parades 
between 1965 and 1994, showing how. as an annual ritual and landscape 
spectacle, the parades succeed to a large extent in crearing a sense of awe, 
wonderment and admirarion. Discussion focuses on four aspects of the 
celebrations: the site of the parades, their display and theatricality, the 
composition and involvement of parade participants, and parade themes. We 
also discuss some examples of alternative readings of parade meanings, 
illustrating how ideological hegemony is not total. Copyright 0 1997 Elsevier 
Science Ltd 
Introduction 
Increasingly, in recent years, scholars have recognized that ‘nation‘ and ‘national identity‘ 
are social constructions, that they do not exist as essences but as political, CUkUI2l 
inventions and local tactics (Clifford, 1988: 12). The case of Singapore exemplifies this 
well. On gaining independence through the severance of ties with Malaysia in 1965, 
Singapore found itself in a position of having to rally its people in the exercise of nation- 
building. In 1969, racial riots threatened the fabric of society and again highlighted the 
need for a ‘national identity’ to be developed that cut across racial and cultural lines. 
Economic problems in 1973 and 1974 (triggered off by the oil crisis) and in 1985 and 1986 
(brought on by global recession) again required that Singaporeans pulled together and 
worked as a ‘nation’. In recent times, the broader ‘annihilation of space by time’ (Marx, 
quoted in Massey, 1993: 232)-the process of globalization-has further contributed to 
the felt need to assert a sense of the local and to construct a shared national identity. 
Together, these examples illustrate how, at various points in its history, Singapore has 
been confronted with different crises in which it has been necessary to develop and 
sustain a sense of national identity and belonging. 
Our focus in this paper is on one of the means by which the state hopes to develop a 
sense of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’. Our specific aim is to analyse National tiy 
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p2KKkS in Singapore from 1965 to 1994 as evidence of the state’s efforts at inventing ritual 
and creating landscape spectacle in order to build up national identity and develop an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). We will do so by analyzing the strands that make 
up this secular ritual and landscape spectacle, namely: the constitution of ceremonial 
space; the contribution to display and theatricality; the composition of parade 
participants; and the selection of parade motifs. In the course of discussion, we will 
examine how the specific strategies may have changed over time and why. These four 
themes have been chosen because they are strategies that the state has chosen to achieve 
its ends. Different levels of overtness in ideological intent are evident in the four. While 
the ideological messages are less overt in the first three themes, parade motifs most 
obviously convey ideological meanings. We will also discuss instances of alternative 
readings of these parades, illustrating how state hegemony is not complete. Our 
discussions are based on a combination of sources: official documents in the form of 
souvenir programmes and magazines,’ newspaper reports2 and interviews with 
spectators and participants.’ 
Concepts and contexts 
As Jackson and Penrose (1993: 8) have argued, the term ‘nation’ is a social construct. It 
draws on notions of common interest between heterogeneous groups and by grounding it 
in physical space and delimiting a recognizable territory, belief in the existence, legitimacy 
and inviolability of the entity is reinforced. The ‘nation’ comprises an ‘imagined 
community’, imagined because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 1983: 15). At the same time, nations are 
communities ‘because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail 
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 
1983: 16). Central to the construction of a ‘nation’ is also the articulation of a ‘mystical bond 
between people and place’, an immutable relationship between citizens and their country 
(Penrose, 1993: 29). In circumstances where heterogeneous groups are involved, where a 
shared history is lacking, and where any nascent sense of nation and national identity is 
threatened by global (sometimes interpreted as western) forces, the bonds between 
members of the community, and between people and place, is at best tenuous, and requires 
nurturing. Indeed, given that identities are conjunctural and socially constructed rather than 
of the essence and natural (Clifford, 1988: 12; Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Cohen, 1993>, it 
follows that at particular times and under particular conditions, the sense of national 
identity is especially threatened. In other words, the need to foster and assert the sense of 
identity may be stronger at some times than others. 
For example, it has been shown that the rise of the modern nation-state exemplifies one 
particular condition under which there is a need to develop and assert the sense of 
identity. This is well-discussed in a series of benchmark essays in Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s (1983) 7;be Investion of Tradition in the context of Europe, in which it is 
suggested that traditions, such as the national anthem and the national flag, were invented 
in order to ‘inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1) as part 
of nation-building. It has also been argued that in recent times, with improved 
telecommunications and the growth in travel and tourism, time-space compression has 
led to the loss of a ‘sense of local place and its particularity’. This has led some to 
reactionary responses: ‘certain forms of, nationalism, sentimentalized recovering of 
sanitized “heritages”’ (Massey, 1993: 232). Featherstone (1993: 177) suggests that with 
I.II.~. KONG ANI) BKENIM S. A. YFOH 215 
greater globalization, there is the ‘generation of such nationalistic, ethnic and fundamen- 
talist reactions to globalization [that there is] a strong assertion of local cultures. These 
might take the form of reviving or simulating local traditions and ceremonies, or inventing 
new ones’. Attempts may be made to produce ‘homogeneous, integrated common 
cultures and standardized citizens loyal to the national ideal’, for example, through the 
‘establishment of national symbols and ceremonies and the reinvention of traditions‘ 
(Featherstone, 1993: 178). Under these circumstances, the rites and ceremonies need not 
be invented em nihilo because they can draw on traditions and ethnic cultures that 
possessed plausibility (Featherstone, 1993: 17X). 
In our analysis of Singapore’s National Day parades, we take as our starting point this 
idea that nations and national identities are socially constructed. We will discuss the 
attempts at such construction, given the chequered historical conditions characterizing 
the birth of the Republic, and the perceived and real threats to its survival since 1965. In 
attempting this analysis, we will adopt the notions of ritual and spectacle. 
Ritual entails oft-repeated actions, routinely followed according to some due form and 
order. Rituals may be associated with religious or secular origins. Our concern here is only 
with the latter, which can take a variety of forms, such as the annual New Year 
celebrations, or the rituals of everyday life such as who buys the drinks in which order 
(Featherstone, 1993: 178). In the context of this paper, we are less concerned with the 
ordinary and everyday than with the spectacular and episodic. Specifically, we analyze 
National Day psrades as secular or civic rituals that are stage-managed once a year. 
Ritual is distinguished by certain characteristics and functions. First, Goheen (19931,: 
131) has suggested that celebration in the form of civic ritual is place and time apart. This 
is because all normal business is interrupted for the parade: streets are decorated in 
exceptional ways, costumes of parade participants are specially designed and music is 
publicly played. Together with the mammoth crowds that gather in the parade grounds, 
along the streets or at vantage points, the atmosphere is transformed into an emotive one 
and place and time are set apart (Goheen, 1993b: 131-132). Second, ritual is ‘potentially 
a period of scrutinisation of the central values and axioms of the culture in which it 
occurs‘ (Turner. 1974a: lib). As Wilson (1954: 241) argues in the context of religious 
ritual, they reveal values at their deepest level because ‘men [sic] express in ritual what 
moves them most’. Indeed, she expresses the view that ‘the study of rituals [is1 the key to 
an understanding of the essential constitution of human societies’. Often, it is argued that 
the values that rituals reveal and emphasize are shared values (Goheen, 19931~: 131) since 
collective participation in ritual suggests affirmation of those values being celebrated. 
Apart from the links with a society’s values, a third and closely related characteristic 
of ritual is its inextricable links to social relationships. In particular, Marston (1989: 255) 
has suggested that parades, as a specific form of ritual, are ‘complex commentaries’ on 
social relations. They ‘are both shaped by the field of power relations in which they 
take place, and are attempts to act on and influence those relations‘ (Davis, 1986: 6). 
This is possible because 
in them performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and 
ideas are available for communication and consideration. These defining images 
in turn shape the actions and alternatives people can imagine and propose. 
(kvis, 1086: 6) 
A specific example of the link between ritual and social relations is the way in which 
rituals reinforce group cohesion: by emphasizing the common attribute of citizenship 
(Goheen, 1993b: 131) or belonging, by highlighting the shared values of society (Bocock, 
216 The construction of national identity through the production of ritual and spectucb 
1974: 174), by demonstrating community power and solidarity (Marston, 1989: 255), and 
by allowing for a suspension of the structures that govern day-to-day social relationships, 
often a suppression of the normally dominant relations. This condition has been termed 
‘liminality’, defined by Turner (1974a: 156; 19743) as ‘a time and place of withdrawal from 
normal modes of social action’. In these ways, rituals contribute to social and political life 
by creating a ‘sense of community’, often cutting across class lines (Kaplan, 1984: 173). 
A fourth characteristic of ritual is its role in sustaining a sense of place, which can be 
interpreted at a variety of levels. Connerton (1989) argues that ritual performances and 
commemorative ceremonies are important in building up collective memory, which is in 
turn crucial for the development of a sense of home. Certainly this argument, writ large, 
suggests that rituals can help to sustain a sense of nation. 
Spectacle is characterized by a high degree of display and theatricality (Daniels and 
C&grove, 1993: 58). As a landscape metaphor, it impresses not so much by its actual 
substance but through pageantry, fanfare and show. Spectacle may he designed to create 
an impact through the use of fear (thus, a punitive strategy) or the use of awe and wonder 
(a celebratory strategy). The former may be effected through public torture, execution 
and other punishment meted out in excess, often using the body as the site of spectacle: 
it is marked, trained, tortured, forced to carry out tasks; it performs ceremonies and emits 
signs (Foucauk, 1979; Tuan, 1979: 182). Our concern, however, is with the latter, in which 
spectacle is used to inspire positive feelings of admiration and wonder rather than fear 
and terror. In this instance, spectacle connotes triumph and proclaims achievement. This 
may be attained through the deliberate use of ceremony; the conscious construction of 
pomp; the creation of occasion and circumstances for celebration; and visual effects (Ley 
and Olds, 198X; Kearns, 1993; Yeoh and Lau, 1995). Indeed, for Debord (1973), spectacle 
pervades the whole of social life, invading the realms of production and consumption, 
and in fact, of consciousness. 
Whether it is fear or admiration that is intended, spectacle can be an effective means of 
social control. Foucault (1979: 91, for example, argues that the threat of punishment, 
emphasized through spectacle, leaves the domain of everyday perceptions and enters that 
of the abstract consciousness. In the same way, the impression of triumph and 
achievement, celebration and carnival can enter the realm of abstract consciousness 
beyond the immediate experience of witnessing the spectacle. The effect is therefore that 
ideological intent can invade the private realm of everyday life through the use of 
hegemonic means rather than force. As Ley and Olds (1988) recognize, the elite, through 
their control of spectacle, can effect strong influence in the realm of social life and 
popular consciousness. Applied in the context of this paper, the concepts of spectacle and 
ritual become useful in attempting to understand the state’s attempt to develop national 
pride, construct national identity and inculcate loyalty. 
Hegemony, while generally a more effective weapon than outright force, is, however, 
never fully achieved (Gramsci, 1973). In other words, those seeking to gain and/or 
maintain power, or more generally, to propagate or perpetuate a particular ideology, will 
always be challenged in some way by other groups in society. Resistance may be overt 
and material, as in riots and demonstrations, but it could as well be latent and symbolic. 
Our focus will mainly be on the latter, in which resistance, representing political action, 
can be conveyed in social and cultural terms, for example, through the appropriation and 
transformation of the resources of the dominating group (see for example, Hall and 
Jefferson, 1976; Hall et al., 1978; Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982). Such 
resistance represents what de Certeau (1984: xix) calls the means by which the ‘weak’ 
create their own sphere of autonomous action and self-determination within the 
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constraints placed on them by the ‘strong’, or what Scott t 1985) calls the ‘weapons of the 
weak’. As de Certeau (1984: 36-7) goes on to argue, the actions of the weak represent 
‘tactics’ rather than ‘strategies’ in that tactics involve seizing ‘propitious moments’ and 
‘space[sl of the other’ and turning them to one’s own ends, thus making them 
opportunities. On the other hand, ‘strategies’ imply that people have at their disposal 
spaces of their own from which they can launch their ‘attack’/‘resistance‘. 
In the present context, we will argue that the state attempts to persuade Singaporeana 
of the naturalness of its ideologies by using the spectacle and ritual of National Day 
parades. Such hegemony is usually successful, as we will illustrate below, although there 
are instances of resistance. Such resistance usually represents tactics, revealing ‘the cracks 
that lydrticular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers‘ (de 
Certeau. 1984: 57). 
A new state, a new social order: nation and nation-building in Singapore 
Before attempting our analysis of the role of National Day parades in nation-building. we 
will first sketch the prevailing context in post-war Singapore to provide the local 
backcloth to understanding the creation of a ‘nation’. 
On reoccupying Singapore in 1945 after the end of the Second World War, the British 
encountered fundamentally new political attitudes and aspirations among the people of 
the colony. Not only had the Japanese occupation socially and economically ravaged the 
island. it had also shattered the myth of white superiority and British invincibility. In April 
1946. the British made Singapore a distinct colony separate from the Malayan Union, a 
move that eventually led to internal self-government and the installation of the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) government in 1959. After a failed attempt at merger with Malaysia 
( 1963-S). Singapore became an independent sovereign state on 9 August 1965. 
The age of independence thus dawned at the end of a slow and uneven road. Prior 
to merger, the PAP had consistently and fervently campaigned for ‘independence 
through merger’, as it was never believed at the time that Singapore could survive 
economically or politically without its hinterland, the Federation of MaktySia (Yea and 
Lau, 1991: 14X). ‘National identity’ as conceived then was thus directed towards Malaya. 
However. with the merger, the anti-communalist leadership of the city-state ‘was 
increasingly at odds with the more conservative, Malay-dominated leadership of the 
Central Government’ (Chew, 1991: 363). Within the new polity, the PAP’s vision of a 
non-communal multiracial ‘Malaysian Malaysia‘ rekindled fears within the Federation 
that Malay privileges would be withdrawn and that the racial arithmetic’ might be 
turned against the Malays if the PAP should gain ascendency (Yea and Lau, 1991: 147). 
This propelled Singapore‘s exit from Malaysia, and with the union peremptorily severed 
in August 1965, the PAP ironically found itself having to disprove its original contention 
that an independent Singapore was not viable (Yea and Lau, 1991: 149). The 
parameters that engendered the mood of uncertainty at the time were stark: the island 
had no natural resource base to depend on, external relations with immediate 
neighhours Malaysia and Indonesia were strained, the communist challenge was 
‘crippled but not crushed’ (Chew, 1991: 3631, and Singapore’s vulnerability was further 
underscored by the withdrawal of British military forces from 1967. Singapore was ‘a 
complex, multiracial community with little sense of common history, with a group 
purpose which is yet to be properly articulated, in the process of rapid transition 
towards a destiny which we do not know yet’ (Gob Keng Swee, then Minister of the 
Interior and Defence, quoted in Chew, 1991: 363). National survival became the 
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dominant preoccupation of Singapore’s political leaders, who urged the people to 
‘buckle down to the job of “nation-building”’ (Benjamin, 1988: 20). 
The formation of a new nation-state represents a radical discontinuity from the past and 
is the product of ‘conscious goal-directed planning’ (Benjamin, 1988: 3). In the case of 
Singapore, strategies were mounted to tackle major socioeconomic problems which 
threatened the fragile fabric of the newly created ‘nation’, including racial tensions, 
economic backwardness and unemployment, housing shortages and health concerns. 
These policies and plans were not only intended to improve living conditions for the 
people but were also intimately linked to the government‘s bid to secure political 
legitimacy, build ideological consensus and transform the population into a disciplined 
industrial workforce (Chua, 1991). Beyond meeting the immediate and more long-term 
material needs of the people, it was equally crucial to forge common consciousness of a 
sense of identity with the nation-state. Singapore’s leaders had to fundamentally reshape 
the ‘primacy of places’ in people’s consciousness and in turn replace it by ‘an abstractly 
conceptualized and much less immediate linkage with a generalized area’, in this case, a 
‘nation’ defined by political and territorial boundaries (Benjamin, 1988: 3). This was 
particularly crucial in the case of Singapore where, for nearly 150 years of colonial rule, 
the island’s population had consisted primarily of immigrants hailing from different 
‘homelands’ (such as China, India and the Malay world), and where even the locally born 
‘had to anchor their political [and cultural] orientation through myths of the ancestor 
homes‘ (Chua and Kuo, 1990: 2). 
A corollary of place-bonding in the construction of nationhood is the welding of 
individuals within the legitimized borders of the independent ‘nation’ into ‘one people’. 
The state’s vision was to integrate the ‘nation’ on the basis of principles to create a 
‘multiracial, non-communist, non-aligned, and democratic socialist state’ (Ghan, 1991: 158). 
In 1966, a Constitution Commission was appointed to enshrine the multiracial ideal in the 
constitution in order to safeguard the rights of racial, linguistic and religious minorities 
(Chan, 1991: 159). Multiracialism (along with multilingualism, multireligiosity and 
multiculturalism) has since then been promulgated as a social formula to forge a single 
identity out of the heterogeneous population riven by racial, religious, language and 
cultural lines (Betts, 1975; Benjamin, 1976; Siddique, 1989: 365). This state-vaunted 
formulation designates four ‘official’ races-Chinese, Malays, Indians and ‘Others’- 
viewed as separate but equal, and encourages acceptance of the coexistence of different 
religious practices, customs and traditions of the various communities ‘without 
discrimination for any particular community’ (Ghan and Evers, 1978: 123). The PAP 
government had consistently regarded racial chauvinism as one of the two main threats to 
nation-building (the other being communism) and strove to ensure a balance between the 
interests of the different racial groups through its policies relating to education, housing, 
language and, most recently, the formation of self-help groups (Chiew, 1985; Shee, 1985). 
While each race is urged to maintain and draw sustenance from a carefully contained sense 
of ethnic and cultural identity, they are also encouraged to develop a larger identity based 
on secular, non-cultural national values. Communalist sentiments based on race, dialect, 
surname or regional affinity must be broken down and replaced with social relationships 
that derive their meaning from the overarching ‘nation-state framework’ (Benjamin, 1988: 
36). By appeasing and containing ethnic demands, the multiracial ideology ‘contributes to 
the nation building process’ (Hill and Lian, 1995: 5). 
The process of nation-building thus requires that the state interferes with the 
consciousness of its new citizens, turning people’s attention away from more parochial 
concerns towards the nation-state. This process of constructing a ‘nation’ and a ‘people’ 
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from their ‘almost non-existent past’ has a short history of no more than 30 years and is 
thus ‘relatively shallow and extremely fluid and formative’ (Chua and Kuo, 1990: 5). In the 
immediate post-independence era, the reality and rhetoric of national survival in the face 
of threats (such as communism) and heavy odds (such as the lack of natural resources) 
became the major rallying point for mobilizing the population and inculcating national 
consciousness. At least before the 198Os, the national values selected to form the bedrock 
of national identity were deliberately pragmatic rather than associated with any one 
cultural tradition; they were ‘universalistic‘ values relating to modernity. development and 
economic success (Ghan and Evers, 1978: 122, 125). In more recent times, economic 
success has brought with it ‘substantial injection of self-definition and national pride’, 
contributing significantly to the development of national culture and identity (Chua and 
Kuo, 1990: 6). In the climate of success, the rhetoric of ‘survival’ and ‘necessity‘, while not 
totally abandoned, is no longer compelling in mobilizing people to unite in their strivings. 
Instead, with affluence opening up the avenues of choice and individual preferences, 
new imperatives had to be found that could justify the moulding of a singular national 
identity (Chua, 19X5: 42; Hill and Lian, 1995: 11). The focus of national identity 
construction from the mid-1980s has in turn broadened to include an emphasis on the 
collective history, heritage and struggles of ‘one people’, a revival of ‘Asian values’, and 
the development of a national ideology, ‘shared values’ (Stmits Times, 6 January 1991) 
culled from a selective distillation of ‘eastern‘ and ‘western’ mores, and of traditional and 
progressive elements. ‘Janus-faced‘, the state in the process of nation building ‘select[s] 
from the past and reconstitutelsl those elements which are identified as possible sources 
of cultural ballast and therefore of stability while simultaneously orienting citizens 
towards the achievement of future goals’ (Hill and Lian, 1995: 36). This new 
consciousness of being ‘one people‘, cutting across divisive lines belonging to ‘one place’, 
is symbolized and solidified by the institutionalization of routinized and ceremonial ritual 
practices, including saluting the national flag, singing the national anthem, taking the 
pledge of 1Oydlty to serve the country ‘regardless of race, language or religion’ and. as will 
be discussed here. staging and participating in National I1ay parades. 
National Day parades: the invention of ritual and the creation of landscape spectacle 
Imp-faced Chou Shixian, 11 His spirits soared 3s he screamed. sang, and 
then screamed some more. He needed no prompting as spontaneity was in the 
air. Shixian was not alone. There were 60,000 others like him at the stadium that 
night. some older, some younger. All of them were determined to have a party. 
They cheered as they waved their small red and white plastic tlaga at a man who 
stood in for President Ong Teng Cheong. Standing still. they sang the national 
anthem and took the pledge. Finally, they sang the Happy Birthday song to 
Singapore when :L giant two-tiered pink cake was wheeled into the stadium. I 
was amazed at what I saw because all of this happened at ;I parade review. Then 
yesterday, I saw a repeat performance by 60,000 other spectators. What a 
spectacle it was, seeing, hearing and feeling Singaporeans cheering for 
Singapore. I had seen the parade three times before and yet I felt the goose- 
humps. The Singapore spirit had hit me. Yesterday. this cynic became a convert. 
(Nirmala, 7094: 6) 
After this, one feels like one would fight and die for Singapore.(Paracle 
spectator, quoted in Stmits Times. 10 August l%(1) 
The above quotations illustrate well the effect that spectacular National Day parades 
have on ordinary Singaporeans: the sense of belonging and identity, and the feeling of 
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pride, are abundantly evident. How have these effects been achieved? In this section, 
we will analyse National Day parades in Singapore from 1965 to 1994. These parades, 
organized by the Singapore Armed Forces, serve as evidence of the state’s efforts at 
inventing ritual and creating landscape spectacle. We will explore four strands of this 
secular ritual and landscape spectacle: the constitution of ceremonial space, the 
contribution to display and theatricality, the composition of parade participants and the 
selection of parade motifs. 
Dmwing on symbolic capital: the making of ceremonial space 
If spectacle means ‘something to wonder at, thus touching mystery’ (Daniels and 
Cosgrove, 1993: 581, part of its enchantment derives from the terrain on which it is staged. 
The materiality of the landscape does not simply provide a passive backcloth for the 
enactment of spectacle but its architecture and aesthetics are designed to invade the 
private realm and invite visual consumption of inscribed meanings. Indeed, the choice of 
the landscape in which to stage a spectacle is not a matter of indifference, for ‘some sites 
have more significance than others’ (Kuper, quoted in Goheen, 1993a: 331). 
In 1966, Singapore’s first National Day parade was staged at the Padang, the expanse 
of green characteristically situated at the heart of the colonial city. Fronting a premier 
recreation club and surrounded by municipal offices, the court house, and other religious 
and educational institutions, the Padang had served both as cricket and ceremonial 
ground (a quintessentially British combination) in the colonial days. Its location marked 
it out as the locus of colonial power and civic pride but, significantly, it was from the steps 
of City Hall (once the municipal offices) that Singapore’s first president, Yusof Ishak, took 
the salute from participants of the first National Day march-past on the morning of 
9 August 1966 (Straits Times, 10 August 1966). Framed by august edifices of imperial 
origin, the sea of green vanished beneath the feet of several thousand parade participants 
arranged in serried ranks and wielding military and musical instruments, flags and other 
paraphernalia. The appropriation of this ‘green cricket ground that once symbolised 
white colonial rule’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1990) for the staging of a national event, a 
celebration of the emergence of the ‘nation’ from a colonial past, serves to illustrate the 
fact that landscape meanings are not static but are constantly reinscribed (%tf? I). While 
societies emerging from colonialism may attempt to divest the landscape of colonial 
associations by removing its stock of colonial structures such as statuary and street-names 
(Lewandowski, 19841, in practice, post-colonial societies often .do not have the capability 
to rewrite forthwith a new image in their cities’ as ‘other priorities clamor’ and colonial 
structures are often appropriated for new purposes and re-invested with new meanings 
(Western, 1985: 344). The National Day spectacle thus depends for its effects on 
combining the architectural spectacularity of the past and the animated spectacularity of 
the moment. By the 199Os, the captivating effects of the latter are stronger compared to 
the former, as evident in the fact that for the majority of the people, the site is not so much 
associated with ‘British rule’ as with ‘a distinctive architectural style’ (Kong and Yeoh, 
1994: 257). As national ritual, National Day parades draw selectively from historically 
sedimented symbolic capital in the landscape; at the same time, since landscape is a 
constantly growing repository of collective memory, new uses as national parade ground 
inscribe new meanings which go some way in obscuring older significances. 
Parades do not simply occupy central space but also move through space as a means 
of diffusing the effects of spectacle. From the Padang, the National Day parade wound its 
way through thickly populated Chinatown, cheered by the people, ‘normally indifferent 
PIAI~ 1. The Padang is transformed from green cricket ground to :I kaleidoscopic parade ground 
framed by architectural imprinP+ of the colonial pa\t and over-reaching skyscrapers and office 
towers. symbols of modernity and progress. 
to police and soldiers’ (Straits Timex, 10 August 1966), crowding along roadsides and five- 
foot-ways,’ waving from windows, and clambering over bridges and balconies. In other 
years during the 1960s and early 197Os, the marching columns not only traversed the 
older parts of the central city but also headed towards the satellite towns and housing 
estates such as Alexandra and Queenstown (Stmits Times. 9 August 1968: Surzda_v Timx 
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10 August 1969). In the days before ‘live’ telecast of the parades brought the spectacle into 
the homes of every Singaporean, these long marches comprising different excerpts of the 
main pageantry multiplied the effects of spectacle by invading the spaces of everyday life 
and transforming ordinary streets into theatres of pomp. Parading, by traversing and 
transforming ordinary spaces, allows the ‘symbolic capture’ (Berger, quoted in Goheen, 
1993a: 348) of spectacles to move beyond the locus of the ceremonial landscape to the 
habitations of the people. 
Following a similar logic of bringing the parades closer to the people, the National Day 
parade was decentralized every alternate year between 1975 and 1984 and held 
throughout the island at 13 selected centres at the heart of residential areas such as Farrer 
Park, Jalan Besar, Jurong. Paya Lebar, Redhill, Tod Payoh and Queenstown. Staggered 
between 8.30 a.m. and 5.30 p.m., each segment lasted about an hour, followed by route 
marches through the neighbouring areas. In form and composition, the decentralized 
mini-parades of at least 3000 participants each were scated-down replicas of the typical 
unified parade, featuring contingents comprising military units, school uniformed groups, 
trade unions and cultural and civic organizations. Each ‘pocket pageant’ or ‘travelling 
parade’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1975; Sou~~eelair Magazine, 1990: 14), however, was 
distinguished by some special highlights to showcase local talent, usually dance numbers. 
pugilistic displays or band items, performed by school, athletic or cultural troupes drawn 
from the surrounding catchment of five constituencies. The prime minister and cabinet 
members also spread themselves among the different centres on a time sequence bdSiS to 
act as reviewing ministers for the march-pasts. The underlying idea was to celebrate in a 
more informal way and to provide more citizens across the island ‘the opportunity of 
witnessing the pomp and pageantry’ of the parade (Straits Times, 14 July 1975). According 
to S. Kajaratnam, then foreign minister, the aim was also to involve more people at the 
grassroots level, so that people ‘[would] get the satisfaction of knowing that they [could] 
organise such a function [successfully]’ in the spirit of ‘democracy [which] after all meant 
“running things for the people by the people”’ (Struits Times, 10 August 1975). These 
decentralized parades were thus meant to combine local resources with national prestige 
in the production of spectacle. 
In the economy of parades intended ‘to demonstrate consensus and civic soliclarity’, 
‘size meant success’ and ‘the largest were among the most memorable’ (Goheen, 1993a: 
342). Large crowds of spectators were crucial to the triumph of spectacle. In 1976, the 
parade was held for the first time at the newly completed National Stadium, which was 
able to admit 60000 spectators. This was the first time that such a large crowd could be 
accommodated, as compared to the smaller crowds of less than 20 000 at the Padang. For 
the first time too, tickets were issued free of charge to ‘people from all walks of life’ in 
place of admission by invitation only in previous years (Struits Times. 18 July 1976). The 
choice of venue reflected both the pride in a new national structure (opened in 1973) and 
the desire to include more people in a collective celebration of the nation. Not only was 
the Stadium able to accommodate a larger crowd both in terms of marchers and 
spectators, it wds also custom-built to altow large crowds to converge in one spot to watch 
the whole parade and to provide observers with a good viev.7 of the parade (Plate L), 
unlike the setting at the Padang where ‘many people had to stand up and crane their 
necks white those who remained seated missed seeing the contingents when they 
marched round the sea front’ (Straits Times, 11 August 1976). The ‘national spirit of gaiety 
and togetherness’ would thus be more fully captured, and with the parade timed for the 
softer evening light as opposed to brilliant sunshine. technological wizardry in the form 
of special lighting and sound systems could be tapped to enhance the atmosphere, giving 
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it ‘a touch of magic‘ (Stmits Times. 11 August 1976). As with other C;IXS of ‘grand showlsl 
of strength and patriotism’ which require meticulous orchestration and planning and 
involve large numbers, crowd control is crucial to success; in this regard, the Stadium was 
tailored for such events: ‘there was less confusion among the spectators as there Lvere 
policemen stationed everywhere in the parking lots and entrances to the stadium to guide 
the public’, observed one spectator (Stmits Times, 11 August 1976). While lacking the 
historic grandeur :md associations with a momentous past, the Stadium as a setting for the 
parade conjures up its own sense of occasion and ceremony by its sheer immensity of 
space. convergence of people and technological sophistication. As ;I site of spectaclr, it 
allows for the combination of order and control with large numbers. 
In 1985. it was announced that Nrltional Day parades would lx centralized 
henceforth, with venues alternating between the National Stadium :md the Patlang. The 
logic was that the dispersed events had not provided ;I foccs for the annual 
celebrations in the same way that one big parade could (Straits Times, 11 July 1085). 
In 1986, route marches through the streets were also dispensed with ‘to enable parade 
celebrations to lx focused entirely on-site at the stadium (Struits Times, 12 July 1986). 
The choice of the National Stadium was predicated on the achxntages that it offered. 
Its greater capacity meant that more spectators ~~1~1 be admitted. while its enclosed 
naturr and custom-built structure facilitated spectxtorship. While the Padang did not 
sharr these advantages, it nevertheless continues to lx ilsed for various reasons. Apart 
from its historical importance, outlined above. today the surrounding skyline, compris- 
ing gleaming office towers, five-star hotels of international repute and modernist 
shopping centres. speaks of Singapore’s achievements and progress. The colonial heart 
of the city, of which the Padang is a part, has thus remained the main huh of thr city 
economically and administratively, and hosting the parade there draws on its symbolic 
capital both historically and in present times. This is reflected in ;I press report in 1990, 
in which it M’:IS said that the sight of the then prime minister Let Kuan YCM on the 
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steps of City Hall ‘evoked memories of that historic first parade in 1966 on the very 
same turf of the Padang’ tStr&s Times, 10 August 1990). This symbolic significance 
clearly remains favourably evaluated as seen from the fact that for Singapore’s 25th 
birthday parade in 1990, ‘a parade in the style of earlier parades at the Padang but 
much bigger Iand] grander’ was chosen to mark the celebrations (Souvenir Progr~mme, 
1990: 24). The National Day parade spectacle thus requires the constant change and 
elaboration of ceremonial space: by alternating between sites, it draws on the symbolic 
capital of not one but two landscapes of ‘nationhood’. 
Disphy and theutricality, or ‘How I was converted from cynic to proud Singaporea’1’5 
Apart from the significance of site in contributing to the meaningfulness of National 
Day parades, these parades also seek to impress through their pageantry, fanfare and 
show. This has been achieved in a variety of ways: through the demonstration of 
military might, through the deliberate use of colour, through the manipulation of lights 
and fireworks, and through the orchestration of sound and music. Through the 
combined effect of these orchestrated strategies, National Day parades provide 
abundant vivid images to form the substance of collective memory, in turn contributing 
to the development of a sense of place. 
iMilitary m&&t. In the late 1960~, through the 1970s and early 198Os, spectacle and awe 
were created by columns of tanks, armoured carriers and big guns. The martial 
appearance of these parades were obvious attempts to flex military muscles. National Day 
was an occasion to show Singaporeans and the world that although the island WdS Smll 
and the population inconsiderable, it had every intention to defend itself against external 
threats. As the military developed and armoury became increasingly advanced, land and 
air defence equipment were drawn into the parades to inspire a sense of awe. In 1969, for 
example, AMX13 light tanks made their debut and represented the first announcement of 
the acquisition of mobile armour by the Singapore Armed Forces (Straits Times, 10 August 
1969). In 1970, the first appearance of BAC Strikemaster jet-trainers, turbine-drive 
Alouette III and amphibious V-200 armoured personnel carriers signalled another 
significant step in the Republic’s defence build-up (Straits Times. 10 August 1970). In 
1976, there was the biggest ever flypast by 60 military aircraft. including three Alouette 
helicopters, three Strikemasters, 27 Skyhawks and 27 Hunters from the Republic of 
Singapore Air Force (Straits Times, 18 July 1976). In 1984. the mobile column constituting 
the drive-past included a range of new defence capabilities, such as jeeps used mainly for 
reconnaissance, Ml 13 armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft missiles and AMX13 
tanks. In many ways, this defence build-up was made necessary because Singapore’s exit 
from Malaysia in 1965 and the withdrawal of the British military forces from 1967 left it a 
tiny island with strained relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, and open to possible 
attack by other larger powers. National Day parades were thus excellent platforms to 
impress others and to assure the local people of their army’s capabilities. 
As a sign of Singapore’s ‘coming of age’, the 21st birthday celebrations in 1986 marked 
a turning point in the display of military might on National Day. While military equipment 
has been put on diSpkiy to different degrees since then, parades since that 21st 
anniversary have generally been shorn of their explicit martial appearance. Instead, 
where the military is engaged in the creation of spectacle, it is done with more 
sophistication, involving skill and dexterity rather than the sheer power of equipment. 
This was perhaps a response to popular sentiment that earlier displays of military 
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equipment were becoming ‘boring‘, a view that several interviewees expressed, no doubt 
because as immediate threats of confrontation diminished, the message about Singapore’s 
military might became seemingly ‘irrelevant’ to Singaporeans’ everyday lives. The 
sophistication and skill displayed by members of the armed forces in later years became 
more welcome ‘entertainment’. Hence, in 1986, for example, instead of tanks rumbling 
across the tartan track, the crowds were thrilled by members of the Singapore Armed 
Forces Provost Unit twirling their rifles, tossing their bayonet-tipped rifles, ‘flirting and 
charming the crowd with their practised nonchalance’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1986). 
Their perfectly synchronized steps bore testimony to skills honed from rigorous and 
precise training. This was matched in 1987 by men from the Republic of Singapore Police 
and the armed forces Provost IJnit demonstrating their agility as they skilfully 
manoeuvred their way through intricate patterns on their motorcycles. In 1993, four air 
force Super Skyhawk jets impressed in the first ever arrobatic display. The jets 
‘perform[edl a loop over the Padang in a tight diamond formation with wing tips barely 
metres away from each other before breaking into a bomb burst manoeuvre, flying off in 
four directions’ (Straits Time.$, 9 August 1993). In the same year. 20 skydivers jumped from 
a Super Puma helicopter at about 1800 m. Two freefallers carrying the state flag and the 
commando flag went for precision landings on a 6 X 6 m panel in the centre of the Patlang 
(Straits Times, 10 August 1993). Meanwhile, out at sea, the display and theatricality 
continued with more high-speed drama and daredevil stunts. The highlight was a four- 
minute display by four Police Coast Guard boats performing tight O&degree turns and 
head-on passes, bringing the boats to within a metre of each other at speeds of up to 30 
knots (Straits Times, 9 August 1993). Men from the Republic of Singapore Navy also 
rescued divers from the waters effortlessly; canoeists did their ‘storm rolls’, flipping the 
canoes belly-side up and themselves under and resurfacing on the other side in one swift 
manoeuvre. Daredevils on jet skis and jet scooters did stunning criss-crosses at high 
speeds (Straits 7?mes, 10 August 1993). All provided further evidence of the coordination 
and competence that would be required of the armed forces should ;I crisis occur. The 
message seemed to be that, combined with the ‘bra\vn’ of earlier years was ‘brain’ that 
could be relied on: the military had become increasingly sophisticated not only in terms 
of machinery and equipment, but in terms of strategy and manoeuvre. 
Apart from the general shift in emphasis from the display of equipment to the display 
of skills, any continuing thread in the demonstration of machinery has been done in 
recent years to emphasize not only the sophistication of machinery. but to underline the 
contributions of multiple groups as indication of their role in ‘total defence’. Hence. 
where drive-pasts of vehicles and equipment have taken place in the last ten years. the 
emphasis has shifted from the earlier focus on the Singapore Armed Forces to include the 
Singapore Police Force, Singapore Joint Civil Defence Forces and civil resource owners, 
as in 1990, for example. This reflects the way in which defence is now treated with more 
sophistication as a total concept, involving both the military and civilians. 
7he deliberate use of colour. Throughout all the National Day parades, the striking 
display of colour has constantly been an important component in the making of spectacle. 
The multiple hues that colour the various venues contribute to the sense of celebration, 
carnival and cheer. In one year, for example, the headlines-Colour wins the day’ and ‘A 
moving panorama of colour’ (Stmits Times, 10 August 1973)---captured its integral role in 
contributing to the day’s celebrations. The only difference through the years has been the 
increasingly varied ways in which colour is injected in the parades. In the 1960~ and 
197Os, colour was deliberately used in the costumes and props used by participants of 
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mass displays. Whether it was the T-shirts, skirts, flags, flowers or ribbons worn or used 
by the performers, care was often taken to include bright and cheerful colours such as 
striking yellow, eye-catching red, glittering gold and brilliant blue. This effect of colour 
was achieved through a marking of the body. To borrow Foucault’s (1979) argument in 
relation to public torture, the body becomes the site of spectacle. Bodies are marked 
(clothed), made up and trained to perform, and in this way contribute to the spectacle. In 
the 1980s and 199Os, this became true not only of the performers on the field, but of the 
spectators as well. Whereas spectators go to parades in expectation of witnessing rather 
than contributing to the pageantry and display, they become part of the performance 
through a marking of their bodies. The ‘spectator contingents’ from grassroots 
organizations and private and public bodies become involved through the patterns they 
form, simply by the colour of T-shirts they are asked to wear; the banners, porn-poms and 
flags they wave; and the flashcards they flash to form spectacular displays. Thus, on cue, 
the galleries would explode with beautiful colours, forming an impressive series of 
pictures. Such is the impact of the effective use of colour that in 1990, the parade finale 
V&IS described as ‘culminat[ing] in a joyous burst of kaleidoscopic colours’ (Souvenir 
Programme, 1990). 
7??e manipulation of lights and fireworks. Paralleling the use of colour, National Day 
parade organizing committees have increasingly discovered the impact that lights and 
fireworks can have in exciting a sense of awe. In the 1960s and 197Os, the spectacle of 
fireworks was not harnessed successfully as parades were held during the day and the 
night fireworks were divorced from the celebrations. The impact was thus diffused. What 
is more, in the first year of independence, the firework display fizzled out when, after the 
initial bursts, the rest failed to ignite (Straits Times, 10 August 1966). Instead, earlier 
parades relied on the effect of ‘the stadium cauldron burst[ingl into full flame’ and ‘the 
lighted torch and the flashing electronic lights’ to give ‘the whole atmosphere “a 
touch of magic”’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1976; 11 August 1976). 
In tandem with Singapore’s increasing sophistication and development, the scale and 
spectacle of fireworks has become more effectively harnessed in recent years. Once 
again, the 21st birthday celebrations in 1986 led the way in this, with a blazing laser light 
display, searchlights lighting the night sky, a dazzling firework spectacular with up to 40 
bursts at one time, complemented by spectators’ torchlights. The parade was planned to 
start later than usual to harness the power of night, to capitalize on the lights, lasers and 
fireworks that would come on in the dark. Descriptions in the local newspapers capture 
the success of the grand finale in 1986: 
Green lasers shot across the stadium, swayed, and finally burst into the air like 
machine-gun fire. It resembled a scene from the movie Star Wars and the crowd 
went wild. Next, giant white rays from searchlights pierced the sky Then 
out of the dark sky came the first shock of fireworks. Golden, the first cluster 
clung high in the sky and was followed immediately by more. (Straits Times, 10 
August 1986) 
When the spectators’ torchlights came on, the Stadium was transformed: 
In a flash, a sea of brilliant jewels-rubies, sapphires, opals, diamonds, 
emeralds-set the velvet darkness ablaze. The torches went wild, storm- 
tossed stars in a blank sky. (Straits Times, 10 August 198f5) 
Such fire in the sky succeeded in impressing audiences. As one spectator put it: 
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This is what we came for. It was spectacular, especially how the showers of gold 
changed colours as they fell to the sea. (Fruits Times, 10 August 1993) 
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Others expressed enchantment in their choice of words: ‘sheer magic’, ‘awe-struck’, 
‘fantastic’, ‘majestic blooms of fireworks’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1993). We would argue 
that such spectacle leaves indelible impressions in the minds of spectators. The sense of 
celebration and of the triumph of the evening becomes abstracted and writ large, entering 
the popular consciousness as evidence of Singapore‘s triumph. 
The orchestrutio~z qf sound and music. National Day parades would be unimaginable 
without the song, music and cheers that have come to be associated with the annual 
ritual. Part of the revelry of the celebrations stems from the cacophony of sounds, both 
spontaneous and orchestrated. The booming of guns in the 21-gun salute, the clash of 
cymbals, the beat of drums, the sound of gongs, the music of pipes and tambourines, the 
resounding voices of the Combined Schools choir, and the spontaneous cheers all 
contribute to the crescendo of sound and the air of celebration, all spurred by the energy 
of cheerleaders. 
Such a soundscape is integral to the production of a carnival atmosphere. The festive 
laughter becomes a proclamation of a nation in celebration; the hearty cheers of the 
people symbolize shared values. Together, they demonstrate community power, 
solidarity and group cohesion. 
Parade purtic@ants: ‘We are Singapore’ 
When 00,000 pairs of different coloured hands went up to help unfurl a 
Singapore flag the size of the entire stadium, one could not but feel it was a 
perfect metaphor for the spirit of co-operation that has held this island of diverse 
peoples together for the last 25 years. (Straits Times, 26 August 1990) 
As a public ritual intended to reinforce group cohesion and weld diverse individuals into 
one ‘nation’, by both demonstrating community solidarity as well as augmenting the 
reservoir of collective memory, National Day parades present a view of society 
emphasizing consensus, harmony, the compatibility of constituent parts, an accepted 
hierarchical ordering and shared values. Indeed, parades are often designed ‘to avoid 
creating dissention [sic]’ and to ‘encourage the participants of organized social groups 
whose presence would incorporate the great variety of interests present in the city and 
encourage widespread interest’ (Goheen, 1993b: 133). This is evident in the composition 
of and relations among parade participants. 
From the first parade of 1966, military and police units, youth and uniformed 
organizations, trade unions, sports and cultural troupes, and schools and institutions of 
higher learning have featured prominently. Not only is their inclusion emblematic of 
characteristic themes such as military prowess, the rich cultural heritage of a multiracial 
population, the youthfulness of the ‘nation’, social discipline and a strong work ethic, 
their simultaneous presence, often in splendid marching order and coordinated in 
clockwork fashion, on one single stage and at a culminated high point, speaks of how 
different organically related constituent parts of society have been forged into one 
‘nation’. The National Day parade is ‘a shared event’, ‘a time to stand alongside fellow 
Singaporeans’, ‘a show of the nation’s progress. achievements and aspirations [in1 which 
every Singaporean anticipates and partakes’, ’ an auspicious occasion that is truly by and 
for the people’, a high point that reflects ‘the spirit of many people coming together for 
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a common cause, with a common purpose, in a common celebration’ (Souvenir 
Programme, 1984: 2, 19). 
With the years, the parade grew not only in numbers but also in representation, 
drawing from the commercial, industrial, financial, service and public sectors; uniformed 
groups; institutions of higher learning; schools and various cultural and social 
organizations in order to ‘epitomise the very elements that constitute [Singapore’s] effort 
at nation-building’ (Souvenir Programme, 1984: 2). This shared ‘time apart’, a tapestry 
woven from the different strands of society, is intended as a mirror of the social ‘reality’ 
of being ‘One People, One Nation, One Singapore’ (Souvenir Magazine, 1990). For 
example, in 1990, the year Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as prime minister, Singapore’s 
‘Silver Jubilee Spectacular’ was described as ‘a fitting conclusion’ to the successful 
translation of Lee’s ‘ideal of meaningful ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in a 
common national unity’ into reality (Straits Times, 10 August 1990). 
In this mass display of ‘nationhood’, dissenting elements have no part. For example, 
‘people from all walks of life participated in the national joy’; the ruling party was out in 
force and even members of the Ex-Political Detainees Association (sufficiently reformed 
to be described as being ‘one with Singapore’s aspirations’) participated in the march-past 
(Sun&zy Times, 10 August 1969). Opposition political parties, on the other hand, were 
nowhere in sight. By the 199Os, the spirit of nation-building may have grown more 
expansive: the National Day cultural pageantry appears more ‘diverse’ and ‘inclusive’, 
featuring once overlooked minority groups such as the Eurasians, who have traditionally 
been subsumed in the category ‘Others‘ and consequently unrepresented (Straits Times, 
10 August 1990). However, the line remains tightly drawn: openly dissenting groups are 
nowhere evident. 
As a mass event with a high degree of orchestration, the National Day parade embodies 
in microcosm the hierarchical structure of Singapore society: ordinary citizens either in the 
galleries or on the parade-ground wait upon and/or are reviewed by the ruling elite 
represented by the president who officiates at the parade as well as the cabinet ministers 
and MPs who sit on the reviewing dais behind the president. All matters of protocol and 
procedure are orientated around the office of the president (Rajah and Sinha, 1994). 
However, at the same time as reflecting the hierarchy of power within the ‘nation’, there 
are also other elements of the parade that signify the integration of the rulers and the ruled. 
As part of parades in the early years of independence, members of the ruling elite-the 
ministers for labour, education, culture and social affairs, and defence; parliamentary 
secretaries; and members of parliament-donned uniforms and marched in the ranks of 
the officer cadets of the People’s Defence Force (Straits Times, 10 August 1966). The PAP 
contingent, comprising second-line leadership in parliament, is also a staple item in the 
parade. In a bid to innovate in 1993, eight national leaders left their usual seats on the steps 
of City Hall and sat in the spectator stands among the crowd of 20000 at the Padang 
(Straits Times, 4 August 1993). These manoeuvres are intended to demonstrate that while 
not all are equal in standing, each citizen, whether numbering among the ruling elite or 
rank and file, plays an equally significant role in the ‘arduous task’ of nation-building. In 
the words of the then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, ‘we can achieve excellence by 
demonstrating that we, the people and the leaders, are united in facing up to our problems 
and are prepared to make sacrifices to surmount them’ (SouvenirMagazine, 1986). This 
‘feeling of “oneness”, of belonging to the same team whatever the differences in 
origins’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Souvenir Magazine, 1987) was unexpectedly 
demonstrated in certain years when the weather denied its cooperation; for example, in 
1968, thousands of Singaporeans-from the acting vice-president who reviewed the 
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parade bareheaded, the prime minister and his cabinet members who stood solemnly in 
the rain, down to the men, women and school children on the Padang, mud-splattered and 
bedraggled-all braved the rain in an hour-long downpour to salute National Day (Struits 
Times, 9 August 1968). The binding ethos of nation-building allowed no room for flinching 
(at least outwardly); each is expected to stand his/her ground and play his/her part in a 
show of defiance against the natural elements, a symbolic gesture of individual sacrifice 
and togetherness in facing the rigours of national development ‘whatever the odds’ (Stmits 
Times, 10 August 1975). Thus, at the same time as playing out in ritualistic form the 
hierarchies governing social relations in society, the parades also present an illusion of 
solidarity between the ruling elite and the people. 
Theoretically, while one may distinguish between ‘ritual ceremony’ as ‘a serious and 
formalised pageantry designed to be observed rather than prdctised’ and ‘the carniva- 
lesque’ as ‘a public spectacle created by and for its participants’ (Smith, 1995: 143). the 
National Day parade has from its inception combined both strategies in its attempt to 
remind people of their common experience as citizens and as a statement of collective 
identity and Singapore‘s ‘nationhood’. From the mid-1980s, however, there was a 
conscious move towards opening up more space for the people’s participation: ‘In a 
dramatic change of format, the 1985 to 1989 Parades became People’s Parades. The 
spectators not only watched the parade but became active participants themselves in song 
and movement’ (Souvenir Muguzine, 1990: 20). 
I3efore the 1985 parade. the crowds had been involved in the parades mainly as 
spectators, cheering the marchers. occasionally reciprocating overtures on the part of the 
performers wittl applause, screams and other means of expressing shared sentiment and 
appreciation. As observers. they had often been caught up and had joined in the spirit of 
the parade, but generally their active participation was only required at selected moments 
such as the singing of the National Anthem and not in the direct execution of the parade 
and accompanying mass displays. From the mid-19XOs, it was promised that there would 
be .less parading, more entertainment and more audience participation’ at the 
celebrations (Straits Times, 12 -July 19x6). More definite roles were carved out for those 
who Lvere not directly centre stage, whether as participants in marching contingents or in 
field displays. The orchestration of the spectacle included the ‘enthusiastic participation‘ 
of cheerleaders rousing the crowds, the choir lending support from the sidelines, and the 
synchronized nlanoeuvres of flashcard display contingents ( Souwnir Magazine, 1992). 
‘Spectator contingents’ were also cued to flick on torchlights in unison as part of the 
‘visual treat’ (1986), dressed in coordinated colours and signalled to wave colourful 
umbrellas (198X). or Big Hands specially made for spectators to put on and wave in the 
air (1989). These choreographed spectator displays, often timed to harmonize with the 
grand finale, were intended to ‘signify an expression of [the people‘s] support for the aim 
to build a nation of excellence’ (Straits Times. 12 July 1986) (I%zte -3). 
As .people‘s pdrddes‘, the National Day celebrations from the mid-1980s took on a more 
distinct air of informality: the ‘ceremonial‘ portion-the recitation of the pledge, the 
inspection of the guard-of-honour by the president. the 21-gun salute and the march- 
past-was condensed while the ‘celebration‘ segment-aerial displays, mass displays on 
the parrlde ground, laser and fireworks displays. and spectator participation-was 
augmented. A whole hour prior to the start of the parade wx set aside for ‘audience- 
loosening’ exercises ‘to set the atmosphere for the parade’ (Struits Times, 9 August 1986). 
To encourage a more informal ambience, rock groups and local pop stars were included 
to provide entertainment, locally composed tunes replaced foreign marching strains 
which used to be the standard fare for the march-past, and even the military, for long the 
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RATE 3. Choreographed spectator participation included the massive synchronization of fk%hGUd 
displays, which included the declaration of unity. as in this 25th anniversary proclamation of ‘One 
people, one nation, one Singapore. 
mainstay of the parade, were ‘nudged out of the limelight’ to focus on civilian mass 
displays (Straits Times, 9 and 10 August 1986; 19 August 1990). Even the ceremonial part 
of the parade itself was also modified to reflect the stronger involvement of the people: 
from 1986, a select group of ‘ordinary Singaporeans’ of all ages and from all walks of life, 
ranging from bus driver to businessman, led a mass dedication ceremony involving 
everyone present to affirm their allegiance to the ‘nation’ (Straits Times, 6 August 1986; 
Souvenir Magazine, 1990: 44). By encouraging the widest possible participation, 
ceremony and celebration both signify the binding together of the entire community, the 
‘body politic’ (cf. Daniels and Cosgrove, 1993: 59). 
Two particular parades stand out in denoting the parade as people’s participation in the 
spectacle of nation-building. Twenty-one years after Singapore’s rude thrust into 
independence in 1965, the 1986 National Day parade marked the ‘nation’s coming-out 
party’ when ‘by unspoken consensus, Singaporeans left that episode of their history 
behind for the last time’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1986). To signal this turning point, the 
organizers wanted a parade with a difference, and to do so they ‘put on centrestage’ the 
70000-strong crowd, in the hope of transforming ‘passive spectators’ into active 
participants, not ‘indifferent performers’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1986). The result was ‘a 
spontaneous outpouring in unabashed nationalistic flag-waving‘ as the people celebrated 
(Straits Times, 10 August 1986). As a hawker who viewed the spectacle on television said, 
.the whole act would not have succeeded if everyone did not do his [sic] part’ (Straits 
Times, 11 September 1986). In short, in National Day celebrations over the last decade, 
‘the spectators became the parade’ (Neu: Paper; 10 August 1993). 
In approximating ‘a public spectacle created by and for its participants’, the 1993 
parade, billed as the ‘Nation on Parade’ march-past, attempted to dispense with 
traditional pomp and pageantry and close the gap between the leaders and the people. 
This parade featured spectators themselves filing past the president and leaders on the 
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grandstand, ‘waving paper fans’ and ‘singing lustily’ (Straits Times, 10 September 1993). 
The ‘people on parade’ represented an attempt to seal the bond between leaders and 
people in a (deceptively) spontaneous fashion: it created carefully managed opportun- 
ities for ordinary citizens to catch a glimpse of, and, for a few moments, interact in an 
unceremonious fashion with the president himself. In this limited sense, the National 
Day parade creates a time and place that allow for a temporary suspension of 
dominant-subordinate relationships, a withdrawal from the protocol governing social 
action, thereby inspiring a sense of community and togetherness among Singaporeans. 
Tl’et in this most carnivalesque of National Day parades, seemingly ‘spontaneous’, 
unrehearsed social incorporation was not divorced from social control. In actual fact, 
the people’s march-past required ‘precision military operation timed right down to the 
second’, arduous mock rehearsals with 2500 spectators before the day itself and 
intricate coordination ‘to get the crowd from the stands to the field in eight minutes’ 
(Straits Times, 10 August 199.3). 
National Day parades thus reflect the Bakhtinian notion of a certain carnivalistic 
m&alliance between the ‘lofty‘ and the ,low‘, functioning at points as ‘a pageant without 
footlights and without a division into performers and spectators‘ (Fetch-Serra, 1990: 265). 
In distorting the relationship between performers and spectators, carnival (the parade) is 
no longer a spectacle seen by people; indeed, everyone participates in it. and there is no 
life outside it (Jackson, 1988: 225). In the words of one young spectator-participant at the 
National Day parade: 
We all had a part to play. We were not here just to watch the Prime Minister OI 
the contingents. (Stmits Times. 10 August 19%) 
7be constitutio~2 qf spectucle: parade mot+ 
In a much more direct way, the state’s ideological messages pertaining to nation-building 
have also been transmitted in the themes that have characterized parades through the 
years, including overall parade themes as well as motifs characterizing specific mass and 
placard display items and float decorations. There are themes that have emerged again 
and again consistently through the years, underlining the continued importance of the 
messages. At the same time, others have emerged at particular times in the short history 
of independent Singapore, indicating the specific concerns confronting the nation at 
particular points in time. 
Four messages have unfailingly emerged again and again through the years, evidence 
of their importance in the bedrock of state ideology. The first is that of multiracialism. and 
relatedly, multicutturalism, multilingualism and multireligiosity. The concern, as we have 
already discussed, is that all groups will be fairly treated; that there will be no 
discrimination; that racial chauvinism of any sort should be avoided; that all groups 
should live in harmony; and that racial and cultural sentiments and identities should exist 
only alongside a larger identity based on secular, non-cultural national values. This is 
evident in the tnany multiracial and multicultural items and floats presented year after 
year. The titles of these items and floats scream out the ideological positions 
unequivocally: Joy of harmony’ (1976); ‘Living harmoniously in a multicultural blend’ 
(1985); ‘Unity in rhythm’ (1986); ‘Many races, one nation’ and ‘Many cultures, one people’ 
(1988). In one display item, for example, multiracial participants formed the word ‘Ilnity‘, 
while the programme notes read: ‘Racial harmony and strength in unity. Regardless of 
race, language or religion. For a cohesive society’ (Snuzlenir Pqgramme, 1986: 4X). 
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A second consistent message through the last three decades is concerned with 
youthfulness. This may be interpreted at two levels: the importance of youth in nation- 
building and the relative youthfulness of Singapore as a nation, The exuberance and 
vibrance of youth-of nation and people-are celebrated in song and dance. At the same 
time, the role of youth as ‘citizens of tomorrow‘ is time and again underscored, as 
reflected in titles of items such as ‘Our children our tomorrow’ (1985) and programme 
notes such as: 
Our children are our hope for tomorrow. With youthful energy, our little boys 
and girls show they have the zest and vitality to build bridges to the future. 
(Souvenir Programme, 1991: 24) 
The third and fourth themes that have invariably emerged in related guises are built on 
an ideology of pragmatism. As we have already illustrated, values relating to development 
and economic success, such as social discipline, efficiency and technological rationalism, 
were actively promoted as necessary values for the nation to progress. Amongst other 
avenues, National Day parades became the platform for such an ideological exercise. 
Evident in parade motifs are two values: teamwork and the importance of education and 
training. The former iterates the view that only with determination and social discipline 
can the nation succeed. Thus, the entire parade theme for 1970, a time when Singapore 
was still struggling to achieve economic and political stability. was: ‘Work together for 
security and prosperity’. Working together was critical, so mass displays and floats 
highlighted the importance of unity (‘Unity and progress’ in 1973; ‘Teamwork and loyalty’ 
in 1984 and ‘United as one, together we progress’ in 1984). When Singapore faced 
economic crisis brought on by worldwide recession in 1985 and 1986, Singaporeans were 
again exhorted to work together to weather the storm. The grand finale in the 1986 
parade was hailed ‘Together Singapore‘, in which Singaporeans were exhorted to ‘play 
their part’ so that the nation could ‘count on them’ in the ‘pursuit of excellence for 
Singapore’ (Souverzir Progmmme~ 1986: 53). 
Related to this pragmatic inculcation of a work attitude is a fourth consistent theme, that 
of the importance of education and training in order that economic development can be 
achieved and maintained. Seldom are education and training seen as ends in themselves, 
Instead, they are hailed as holding the key to a more promising future. The emphasis in 
such education and training is also on technology rather than the humanities. For 
example, a 1984 float had as its theme ‘Education and training for higher technology’, 
whilst a 1987 float was entitled .Technology for growth’. 
Apart from these four themes, which have repeatedly reappeared on the agenda since 
1966, we also wish to highlight other motifs which have emerged at particular times in 
Singapore’s and the parade‘s history. These are indicative of the specific concerns that 
have confronted the nation. Several themes have made no more than a single appearance 
as motifs of mass displays or floats. Examples include the need to industrialize to achieve 
success (1970), the need to conserve water (19731, the fight against profiteering (1973), 
and the need for self-reliance (1976). These are certainly historically contingent, reflecting 
the challenges facing the nation at those particular historical moments. 
Apart from these, other themes have also emerged over several years at a time, 
indicative of growing and continued emphasis on underlying ideologies and strategies. 
The first of these is the focus on ‘one people‘, the attempt to create a new consciousness 
and pride for the nation. This was very starkly expressed in 1991 when the grand finale 
entitled ‘Joy and jubilation’ was designed to encourage Singaporeans to express pride for 
their country. This was explicitly articulated in the Soz~~ir Progrurnme (1991: 26): 
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We are proud to be Singaporeans. The celebration expresses all that we feel 
about ourselves, our country and the world in which we live. My Singapore. the 
place that I catt home. 
This was reiterated in the 1992 declaration, ‘We are Singapore’, and again in 1993 when 
the official theme of the celebrations was ‘My Singapore, My Home’. As a spokesman from 
the Ministry of Information and the Arts suggested, the theme is ‘an expression of the 
pride Singaporeans feel for their homeland‘ (Stmits Times, 18 May 1993). The parade was 
thus intended as a platform for Singaporeans to ‘demonstrate a personal statement of 
faith. a declaration of feelings and pride that Singapore is, above all else, a place we can 
call home’ (Colonel Lee Boon Loi. chairman of the executive committee for the parade, 
quoted in Straits 7ime.q 4 August 1993). This explicit attempt at rallying Singaporeans and 
getting them to articulate their sense of attachment and belonging has become particular]) 
apparent in recent years and reflects the state’s reactions to the perceived threats posed 
by global forces, sometimes thought of as westernization. It reveals the concern that 
Singaporeans must be rooted in their Asian heritage while importing the more progressive 
elements of western development, all the time maintaining their ties, loyalty and indeed 
‘mystical bond’ (Penrose, 199.): 29) with place (Singapore). 
Alongside this exhortation to exult in pride for the nation is another exhortation: to 
strive for excellence for Singapore in order that this pride can be sustained. Given that 
Singapore had, by the mid-1980s, achieved a degree of economic success that most Third 
World countries would be happy to emulate, the earlier ideology of survival in its original 
form was no longer convincing as a means of mobilizing Singaporeans. Instead, the 
notion of ‘excellence’ was drawn in: to continue sulTiving, Singapore must excel. Thils. 
in 1986. the parade theme, ‘Together Excellence for Singapore’, found expression in 
a number of mass display items. For example. ‘ToLvards excellence‘ entailed formations 
depic~ting the productivity theme such as the Quality Control circle logo, emphasizing 
teamwork and cooperation, thought to be ‘essential attributes for productivity’ (.Soz4~wir 
P1-ogmmmc. 19X6: 47). ‘Spot on‘ emphasized ‘skill, precision and alertness’, ‘qualities for 
a nation of excellence’ (Souucvriv P~ogmmme, 1986: 19). ‘Towards a brighter tomorrow‘ 
deli\-creel the message for Singaporeans to ‘strive for excellence towards a brighter 
tomorrow for all’ (Sooucenir I+ugrumme. 1987) and ‘Excellence together Singapore 
fore\,& underlined the message that 
We. the people of Singapore. regardless of race. language or religion. 
together. celebrate our National l>ay with singing ot national songs and 
spectacular display of placards and lights. Singapore. ‘ 3 nation of excellence for 
all. (S0/1L’~~12iT. Pro)gmmr,fe I%-#) 
In order to achieve excellence for Singapore, a variety of values and orientations are 
encouraged. National Day parades have again provided the platform for articulating some 
of these, reinforcing other strategies such as the use of national songs (see Kong, 1995). 
One of the values advocated is that of healthy living. In 1986. Singaporeans were 
exhorted through a mass display to ‘keep fit‘ and ‘stay alert for economic progress’ 
( SozrLrnir Progmmme, 1986: 51). In 1989, these found expression as .the qualities of 
physical and mental toughness which make for a rugged society’ ( Souvenir Progrumm~, 
19X9: 26). Time and again. it is emphasized that the quest for good health can be fun 
( 1980) for young and old alike (1992). 
Similarly, excellence for Singapore is only possible if the nation acknowledges its role 
in the international community. In 1991, the mass display item entitled ‘Singapore 
International’ rrcognized the ‘new challenges‘ and ‘new opportunities’ facing Singapore. 
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and emphasized the part that Singaporeans can and should play in the international 
community (Souvenir Programme, 1991: 16). In 1992, the focus turned on Singapore’s 
immediate neighbours in an item entitled ‘Asean togetherness’. 
While this discussion is not exhaustive, our intention is to illustrate how the exercise of 
nation-building has been facilitated by the explicit articulation of values and ideologies 
through parades’ themes, including themes of mass displays and floats. Of the four 
strategies that the state uses in planning National Day celebrations, this is in fact the most 
explicit in ideological intent of all. 
Alternative readings and resistances 
Having illustrated the different strategies that the state employs to develop national 
consciousness and build consensus using National Day parades as a platform, and some 
evidence of the positive responses from Singaporeans, it is as important to note that there 
exist alternative readings and resistances against such hegemonic intentions. In the early 
years of independence, these were more overt and confrontational. For example, in 1966, 
opposition parties (Barisan Socialis and Party Rakyat) condemned the festivities as ‘phoney 
independence’ and ‘an utter waste of public money’ (Straits Times, 10 August 1966) and 
boycotted the parade. In 1970, anti-government banners were found in several areas, some 
with harmless parcels attached (Straits Times, 10 August 1970). In more recent years, 
resistance has become more symbolic and marginal, constituting alternative readings rather 
than outright confrontations. This may well be because in the 1960s, and until the early 
19705 the political situation had bred more open conflict and confrontation. However, 
soon after the PAP came into power, it engaged actively in depoliticizing the citizenry, a 
situation that Chan (1989: 78) characterizes as the development of an administrative state. 
In such a state, ‘time spent by groups and counter-groups to lobby, influence and change 
policy outcomes are [seen to be] a waste of time that detract from the swift implementation 
of the plan and programme’. Should there be counter-opinions, these are managed and 
directed through approved channels, rather than allowed expression in confrontational 
style (Kong, 1993). The political culture in Singapore has thus become one of negligible 
organized opposition and of general non-resistance. 
Given such a context, if Singaporeans’ interpretations of National Day parades, 
particularly in recent years, have been distinct from those intended by the state, they are 
at most different, rather than outwardly confrontational. While the precise nature of these 
alternative readings varied, each was equally unlikely to lead to open conflict. 
In our interviews with participants and spectators, it became evident that there were at 
least three categories of alternative meanings. First, there were the feelings of resentment 
amongst those who participated in the parades. Second, there were those who were 
unhappy about the nature and extent of the parades. Third, there were those who 
enjoyed and appreciated the parades but for entirely different reasons from those 
intended by the state. 
For those who participated in the parades, there were some who felt compelled to be 
there, but resented the sense of compulsion and even entrapment. There were national 
servicemen who were expected to ensure order. (‘I was on duty. I had to do crowd 
control. I was outside the stadium. I was reluctant and I resented it.‘). There were students 
who performed in various items. (‘I was sent by my school. We didn’t like it. None of us 
liked it. Rehearsals were tough. I didn’t enjoy it. We were there because my principal 
wanted us to be there.‘) Many expressed the view that rehearsals were ‘frustrating’ and 
‘tough‘ because ‘you‘ve got to be disciplined’ and ‘wait and wait and wait and go through 
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the sequence again and again’. The language used by many interviewees was telling. 
Instead of ‘we danced to the music’ or ‘we waved our flags’, many of those interviewed 
invariably used phrases such as ‘we had to’ or ‘we were supposed to’, indicating the sense 
of coercion they felt. 
Even though a number of interviewees indicated that the hard work did culminate at 
the actual parade in a feeling of patriotism and fervour, it was generally very short-lived. 
As one interviewee put it: 
J VGIS grateful to break the routine of having my Sunday ‘l,urnt’.” I was grateful 
to break it. Life was back to normal after thar. We went back to our routines and 
I was glad. 
Apart from participants’ resentment, there were also those for whom the nature of the 
annual parades aroused more ‘offensive’ feelings than patriotism. Some were put off by 
the huge sums of money usually spent in putting together the parades. For others, it was 
the perceived routine and lack of creativity from year to year. For yet others, it was the 
blatant nature of the ideological messages (‘It’s so deliberate you feel really skeptical’). 
Some even detect an attempt to deflect Singaporeans’ attention away from the real issues 
and difficult problems confronting Singapore: 
It makes LIS think that everything is good; that we are having a good life in 
Singapore everybody has a ioh and all that. But it doesn’t draw our attention 
IO the more realistic aspects of life I think it makes LIS apathetic because we 
think everything is fine. We are diverting our artention from some of the real 
problems that do exist. Everything is made to look very posirive. 
While there is a certain degree of resentment and objection in the views expressed 
above, thus reflecting a degree of opposition, albeit latent. there were also many for 
whom the parades were viewed positively, although for very different reasons from those 
the state intends. These alternative readings are not confrontational, but nevertheless 
reveal the ‘ractical‘ ways (de Certeau, 1984) in which people appropriate National Day 
parades for personal gain/fulfilment. 
There were vendors, for example, for whom the parades represented opportunities fol 
quick monetary gains. These entrepreneurs turn up at parade grounds not to share in the 
spirit of nationhood but because of its promise as grounds for business (Stmits Times. 10 
August 1986). Prices of drinks, portable fans, caps and the like are marked up as demand 
soars. There are also student participants for whom participation in the parades gives 
them a good record in their extra-curricular activities (ECA). Participation thus becomes 
important at a personal level rather than at the national level in the sense that ‘it will he 
good for my ECA records’, ‘it’s going to up my ECA points’ and ‘it’s going to look good 
on my testimonial’. At yet another level. se\.eral student participants felt that their 
principals wanted them to participate in the parades because they wanted their schools 
to be in the limelight and for them to look capable and supportive of the country. As one 
intemiewee put it: ‘We thought that she was just making use of LIS to get a good reputation 
for the school’. In this sense, such principals arc seen to be less concerned with national 
agendas than aith personal agendas. Thus, instead of being of national import, the 
parades are appropriated in these various instances into ;I personal everyday context in 
Lvhich some personal gain or fulfilment is to be derived. 
For ;I large number of participants and spectators, such parades are in fdct enjoyabk 
Ixx;luse of their entertainment value. Shorn of the ideological intent, the parades are fun‘ 
to entertain chilclren with (‘My little cousins enjoy the song and dance’; ‘It’s one u’ay ot 
keeping my children entertained‘). Some even go to the extent of comparing a parade to 
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a football match, a big party, and an event like the opening of a shopping centre, which 
in Singapore’s context always attracts huge crowds. For student participants, mainly 
teenagers, it was an opportunity to ‘hang around’ with friends all day ‘for a legitimate 
reason’. As one teenage girl put it: ‘It wasn’t a chore because I could be there with my 
friends at weekly rehearsals and scream my lungs out. It was a thoroughly good 
experience.’ In the words of another teenage boy: ‘I found it quite fun because there were 
other schools there and you can get to know people from other schools’. 
Conclusion 
National Day parades serve as a barometer of Singapore’s broader socio-political 
conditions. In particular, the felt need to assert a sense of the local/national to different 
degrees at different times has been captured in the particular manner of National Day 
parades. In the past, the rude thrust into independence and the acute awareness of the 
need to survive in a neighbourhood of regional hostility provided the backdrop against 
which the state sought to construct a sense of nationhood and national identity. This it did 
by using, inter alia, the military flavour of parades, asserting the capabilities of a small 
island in defence. In Singapore’s more recent history, the perceived threat to national 
sovereignty has emanated from global forces, sometimes equated with western forces. In 
line with the changing historical circumstances, the military tenor has receded and the 
parade has become more of a people’s affair. There has also been a movement from 
military defence to total defence, reflecting a movement from the view that defence is the 
province of a few trained specialists to defence involving an entire nation, a people united 
in one voice. Nevertheless, while the parades have undergone considerable elaboration 
and reworking, their basic purpose has remained essentially unchanged. They form part 
of the larger strategy of developing and maintaining a sense of belonging and national 
identity, drawing on pomp and ceremony, visual and aural effect. Indeed, evidence 
points to a degree of success. As one participant put it: 
There ~3s a great spectacle. The feeling was one of a great festival; it was very 
‘carnivalish’. There was a sense of euphoria. heightened emotions, patriotism 
and everything. It was wonderful. 
However, the ‘web of signification’ (Ley and Olds, 1988: 195) spun by the state is not 
entirely compelling and segments of the population have found the possibility of 
expressing their resistance and investing their alternative meanings. 
In essence, National Day parades illustrate how as annual ritual and spectacle they 
serve as means to assert a sense of the local/national and underline the point that 
identification does not happen once and for all (Hall, 1989: 73). By analyzing a form of 
ritual organized and orchestrated by the state, we have tried to illustrate how state power 
is legitimated by appealing to nationalism. We have attempted to examine a powerful and 
dominant group’s use of ritual and spectacle in the form of parades to perpetuate its 
ideologies (see also Smith, 1993). We have therefore added an empirical case that serves 
as a counterpoint to most existing research, which explores parades as expressions of 
subordinate groups’ struggles in their establishment and negotiation of identity. 
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Notes 
1. Official sources (Souvenir Programmes) clearly present a bias since, like actual parades, they 
serve overall state purposes. For this reason, it is impossible to glean any sense of how the 
parades are received by Singaporeans, except when these are obviously supportive. 
2. We have drawn heavily from the Straits Times, which has been described by some as a pro- 
establishment newspaper. For this reason, it has also been difficult to glean from this source 
details of alternative and oppositional readings of the parades, although there are hints every 
now and again. Despite this ‘handicap‘, we have had to I-ely on this ne\vspaper because there are 
no other sources of public accounts of the parades. 
3. Focus group interviews were conducted with three groups of Singaporeans: students in their 
early teens who had recently participated in the parades; young adults (LO-SO); and older adults 
(30-50). The latter two groups comprise those who had either participated or been ‘live‘ 
spectators at a parade. These interviews constituted the main source of information regarding 
alternative readings. thus compensating for the lack of such information in the official sources 
and newspaper reports. 
4. Five-foot-ways are verandahs fronting shophouaes, which are us~~ally two- to three-storey 
structures with residential quarters above the ground-floor shops. 
5. This is the headline to an article reporting one Singaporean’s testimony (Nirmala, 19%). 
6. A coi~oquahsm for ‘wasted’. 
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